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Abstract 
There has been much theorizing about why individuals join interest groups. However, little 
has been done to test the resulting propositions because of the difficulties associated with empirically 
analyzing the joining decision. This deficiency is especially great when it comes to public or 
symbolic interest groups. In this analysis, choice-based probability methods are employed that 
permit the combination of data from the 1980 National Election Study with comparable information 
about Common Cause members and the estimation of models of the participation calculus. Besides 
demonstrating the applicability of the choice-based methodology, this analysis shows the primary 
importance of political interest and policy preferences for the membership choice. Citizens who are 
politically interested and have preferences that roughly match an organization's reputation find that 
associational membership has both greater benefits and lower costs for them than it does for others. 
An ability to pay is irrelevant, regardless of educational attainment and despite members' high 
incomes. Organizational leaders deliberately keep the costs of membership low relative to most 
citizens' ability to pay; this encourages potential contributors to join in order to learn about the 
organization. 
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Introduction: Where Do Public Interest Group Members Come From? 
There has been much theorizing about why individuals join interest groups (e.g., Truman 
195 1, Olson 1965, Moe 1980). Explaining contribution choices is critical for understanding the 
nature of the American political system, but this enterprise has been severely hamstrung by the 
difficulties of utilizing the available data. There is a dearth of individual-level empirical work 
testing hypotheses about why people contribute. Previous empirical analyses have lacked either one 
of two essential ingredients: a nontrivial sample of associational members or a control group of 
nonmembers. National surveys of the American population have so few group members-only 3 
percent of the population report being members of political clubs or organizations (Neuman 
1986}-that students of participation cannot systematically examine contributors (e.g., Verba & Nie
1972): Occasional surveys of group participants (e.g., Moe 1980, Cook 1984) fail to incorporate 
nonmembers. 
This deficiency in our knowledge is particularly great for public or symbolic interest groups 
(Polsby 1981-1982). Their emergence over the last two decades has helped reshape the American 
political scene (McFarland 1976, Berry 1977). As one recent analyst put it, "future scholars may 
come to regard the emergence of a new type of interest group based on ideas rather than material 
interests as a better reflection of the changes reverberating throughout American political life [in the 
1960s and 1970s] than anything else" (Lunch 1987, p. 2 14). Symbolic organizations are seen as 
providing at least a modicum of countervailing authority to traditional economic interest groups. 
Yet what motivates individuals to overcome collective action problems and join these associations 
has proved perplexing. The rise and subsequent institutionalization of symbolic groups constitute 
yet another puzzle of participation (Brody 1978). Even the authors of one of the few attempts to 
analyze empirically membership in public interest groups conceded that why people contribute is 
unknown (Kau & Rubin 1982) after their aggregate-level analysis uncovered little systematic
evidence for why people join. 1 But it is unclear whether their results reflect the idiosyncratic nature
of the contribution decision or the aggregated level of the data. 
This analysis distinguishes between these two possibilities. Individual-level data can be 
generated that contain both key ingredients for studying associational participation, a control group 
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and large numbers of organizational members. The application of econometric techniques that yield 
reasonable estimates make it possible to analyze rigorously why individuals join. The former is 
accomplished by initially combining data about a specific association with those about the national 
electorate: Information from a 198 1 mail survey of over 1200 Common Cause (CC) contributors is 
merged with data from the traditional pre- and postelection cross-sectional surveys of roughly 1600 
individuals interviewed in the 1980 American National Election Studies (NES):2 The latter is 
achieved by subsequently utilizing choice-based probability methods that permit the estimation of 
structural models of the joining decision for endogenously chosen samples. Combining these 
surveys and employing appropriate techniques provide an unparalleled opportunity to test 
hypotheses about the key characteristics determining an organization's membership pool. 
Common Cause is an ideal case for such purposes. Founded in 1971 by John Gardner, it is 
popularly viewed as the quintessential public interest group (for a detailed case study, see McFarland 
1984). It has focused over the years on keeping the government open and free of corruption by 
concentrating on issues associated with governmental structure and process, and it has gained a 
reputation as an opponent of special interests and partisan political institutions. Specifically, it has 
specialized in a variety of "good government" issues-sunshine laws, campaign financing, and 
lobbying restrictions, among them. 3 
The remainder of this analysis proceeds in three steps. The first involves contrasting 
Common Cause members with the national citizenry; this comparison provides a baseline to judge 
how misleading inferences drawn from exclusively descriptive information actually are. 
Subsequently, a theoretical perspective on membership in symbolic organizations such as Common 
Cause is outlined in conjunction with an overview of the costs and benefits of associational 
membership. Finally, models of the contribution process are estimated to determine what factors are 
most salient for membership in symbolic groups. 
Common Cause Members: A Composite Portrait 
Most analyses of interest group membership describe contributors; frequently, it is either 
implicitly or explicitly inferred that those factors apparently differentiating them from the voting age 
population are relevant for the joining decision. There is no statistical basis for such judgments. 
More importantly, are these inferences deceiving? 
Comparison of respondents in the CC and NES samples demonstrates that Common Cause 
members do differ from the average American in predictable sociodemographic, attitudinal, and 
behavioral ways (some of this information can be found in Table la). With respect to the former, 
group members appear far more likely to be college educated, male, white, earning a family income 
in excess of $25,000 per year (in 1980), and over 50 years old. Additionally, contributors are more 
prone to be of European descent, from either New England or Pacific states and not from the South, 
self-employed or retired, occupying a white collar job rather than a clerical or a blue collar position, 
from an urban area, and either reformist Protestant, Unitarian, Jewish, or areligious (not shown).4 
All of this is consistent with what is known about the correlates of political participation (e.g., 
Milbrath and Goel 1977, Bennett and Bennett 1986). 
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(Table la about here) 
Group members also differ from the national citizenry in their policy preferences (Table lb). 
True to what would be expected, Common Cause members are simultaneously more Democratic and 
more independent than the average citizen. In excess of 40 percent of association members describe
themselves as independents but admit that they have a preference for the Democrats. In their
"running tally of retrospective evaluations" (Fiorina 1981, p. 840), members are more likely to think 
that Democratic policy is more to their taste than Republican, but almost two-thirds view parties qua 
institutions negatively and label themselves independents. This finding is generally consistent with 
Common Cause's political activities: Organizational leaders tend to join Democrats in building 
coalitions yet advance policy positions antagonistic to partisan political institutions. Contributors 
are also far more prone than the general electorate to exhibit an ideological predisposition and to be
liberal-once again, in accordance with expectations, given the general perception of Common 
Cause as a liberal group. 
(Table lb about here) 
Association members rate the performance of partisan institutions-the federal government,
Congress, and political parties-roughly the same as the average citizen. By contrast, they are more
positively disposed to the Supreme Court, which is popularly considered a more nonpartisan, 
perhaps more liberal institution and which public interest groups have not traditionally criticized or 
opposed.5 Those who are most committed to changing partisan institutions are most impressed with
nonpartisan politics. 
Contributors and nonmembers also differ dramatically in terms of their behavior, at least for 
those activities on which comparable data are available. These disparities are consistent with the
popular image that public interest group members represent a tiny, activist segment of society. 
Remarkably, more than 70 percent of all organizational members contributed money in the 1980 
election; 20 percent did political work in the campaign. The fraction of the total citizenry involved 
in these activities is miniscule by comparison.6
These descriptive data provide a vivid composite portrait of how the average Common 
Cause member differs from the voting age population. But nothing definitive can be concluded 
about why some citizens join symbolic organizations and others abstain. It is unclear whether there 
is any theoretical reason to believe that some of the characteristics on which members and 
nonmembers vary should make a difference. Once a theoretical model is specified, the resulting 
hypotheses must be econometrically tested. It is to these tasks that attention is now directed. 
The Determinants of Members hip in Public Interest Groups 
The standard conceptualization of the participation decision is as a cost-benefit calculus 
(Mueller 1979). This perspective is adopted here, with the caveat that no strong effort will be made 
to distinguish between whether individuals derive benefits because they mistakenly believe they are 
having an impact on the provision of collective goods or because they believe in the organization's 
TABLE la. COMMON CAUSE MEMBERS AND THE NATIONAL ELECTORATE: 
SELECTED SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
Category (Percentage) 
Characteristic Common Cause National Electorate 
Education 
Some Grade School 0.0 3.4 
Grade School 0.7 1.5 
Some High School 1.0 21.0 
High School 4.7 37.4 
Some College 14.1 20.6 
College 24.6 10.7 
Postgraduate 54.9 5.5 
Gender (Male) 56.6 43.3 
Race (White) 98.5 87.3 
Family Income 
Less than $10,000 5.0 23.1 
$10,000 -$20,000 17.0 23.3 
$20,000 -$25,000 14.8 16.7 
$25,000 -$35,000 19.5 15.3 
$35,000 -$50,000 22.4 16.0 
More than $50,000 21.4 5.5 
Age 
18 -25 2.0 16.4 
25-30 3.9 12.5 
31-40 12.8 20.3 
41 -50 12.2 12.7 
51-60 21.5 15.3 
61-65 14.1 6.8 
66-70 11.7 5.8 
70-older 21.7 10.3 
Source: 1981 Common Cause Survey and 1980 National Election Studies 
TABLE lb. COMMON CAUSE MEMBERS AND THE NATIONAL ELECTORATE: 
POLICY PREFERENCES AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 
Preference/Behavior 
Party Identificationa 
Strong Democrat 
Weak Democrat 
Leaning Democrat 
Pure Independent 
Leaning Republican 
Weak Republican 
Strong Republican 
Ideology 
Extremely Liberal 
Liberal 
Slightly Liberal 
Middle of Road 
Slightly Conservative 
Conservative 
Extremely Conservative 
Can't Say 
Performance Rating: Federal Govt. 
Very Poor 
Poor 
Fair 
Good 
Very Good 
Performance Rating: Congress 
Very Poor 
Poor 
Fair 
Good 
Very Good 
Performance Rating: Supreme Court 
Very Poor 
Poor 
Fair 
Good 
Very Good 
Performance Rating: Political Parties 
Very Poor 
Poor 
Fair 
Good 
Very Good 
Participatory Activity 
Contributed Money in 1980 
Did Political Work in Campaign 
Category (Percentage) 
Common Cause National Electorate 
15.8 18.1 
12.7 23.6 
40.4 11.7 
14.3 13.2 
10.2 10.5 
4.3 14.3 
2.3 8.7 
6.2 1.0 
41.3 5.1 
21.8 7.6 
12.0 24.4 
10.3 14.6 
5.4 14.3 
0.6 1.4 
2.4 31.5 
10.8 6.9 
28.0 31.5 
49.6 52.7 
10.9 8.5 
0.7 0.5 
10.0 6.9 
33.0 35.8 
48.3 46.0 
10.0 8.4 
1.4 0.3 
2.2 8.3 
7.3 23.3 
38.4 41.9 
43.0 23.2 
9.1 3.4 
8.8 5.7 
32.8 31.7 
50.6 52.2 
7.3 8.9 
0.4 1.4 
72.2 5.9 
20.2 3.6 
a Independents are divided into Leaning Democrat, Pure Independent, and Leaning Republican.
Source: 1981 Common Cause Survey and 1980 National Election Studies 
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stated goals.7 Detennining exactly what costs and benefits are likely to be relevant and what
infonnational assumptions are reasonable is far more important. 
Infonnational Assumptions: The Experiential Search Perspective 
The following analysis is predicated on several crucial assumptions: that individuals are 
relatively uninfonned about groups, that they are capable of leaming, and that they know about their 
infonnational shortfalls and deal with them in a cost-effective manner. This perspective has 
previously been labeled experiential search (Rothenberg 1987a,b). It is asserted that individuals only 
have a general idea what a group stands for before deciding to sign up. Certainly if members were 
perfectly infonned, as is assumed in the Olsonian model, an organization would never have to solicit 
members like Common Cause does. 
Experiential search is a function of the fact that the relative costs of acquiring infonnation 
through organizational membership are less than through search outside associations. This is 
especially likely to be the case for contributors to symbolic interest groups. As will be discussed in 
more detail, public interest group leaders consciously keep the cost of membership down relative to 
the target membership's ability to pay to overcome the severe collective action problems they face. 
Given the relative costs of overcoming infonnational shortfalls from outside as compared to inside 
an organization, contributors are likely to join a symbolic association to learn about it 
The existence of experiential search has been demonstrated previously (Rothenberg, 1987a). 
It has been shown, for example, that most members of Common Cause claim they joined the 
association for very broad reasons but much more specific concerns shape their decision whether or 
not to stay in the group. It has also been demonstrated that newcomers to the group differ from 
veteran members in a number of ways: They know less about the organization--how it operates and 
what stances it adopts; they are more likely to find that the association is not a good match for them 
and leave; and they are more likely to rely upon updated infonnation in making a decision whether 
or not to remain in the organization. Finally, it has been found that most individuals join the 
organization as rank-and-file members, learn about it, and then decide whether or not to become 
activists (Rothenberg 1987b). 
What this all implies for the initial membership choice is that broad policy preferences and 
an ability to pay should be particularly important First-time contributors are only likely to have 
very rough evaluations about how much they value the group's magazine or the political infonnation 
furnished to members, the types of interactions offered, the association's specific positions on a 
variety of issues, or the additional monetary and nonpecuniary costs of membership besides annual 
dues. 
Benefits and Costs of Common Cause Membership: Citizen and Organizational Influences 
The standard means of estimating a cost-benefit participation calculus at one point in time is 
to identify what participant characteristics make a difference at the aggregate equilibrium observed. 
Understanding why some imperfectly infonned citizens sign up and others do not, given the 
tremendous problems of collective action, is more complicated: Organizational behavior selectively 
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influences the cost and benefit estimates made by potential contributors. 
Theoretically, it is possible that contacted citizens join randomly and all that matters is 
whom the organization chooses to solicit Alternatively, it is conceivable that associational 
advertising has no pattern and that the joining process is completely driven by potential members' 
preferences. It is almost certain that both citizen and leadership decision-making matter. 
This dual process can be illustrated by distinguishing between organizational and citizen 
attributes. Two organizational attributes are potentially gennane for an association such as Common 
Cause: the level at which annual dues are set and decisions about which citizens to contact about 
joining. As the organization exercises no price discrimination, dues levels are relevant for predicting
supply only temporally, not cross-sectionally. 
Contact is likely to be an important detenninant of membership because it essentially lowers 
the price of being in the organization for poorly informed potential consumers. In principle, actual 
data on whom Common Cause contacted before they decided whether or not to contribute could be 
used to specify a two-stage recursive process that examines first whom is contacted and then who 
joins. However, this infonnation is unavailable; a second-best alternative that is adopted in this 
analysis is to employ data that are linked to the probability of being contacted to estimate a reduced­
fonn equation. 
For Common Cause, the likelihood of being asked to join is virtually tantamount to whether 
one receives a mail solicitation:8
While television and other methods of new membership recruitment are being explored, 
direct mail to date remains the only means of recruiting members in sufficiently large 
numbers to maintain and expand our membership levels. Direct mail is initially expensive. 
In all but one year of Common Cause's history it has cost more to recruit new members than 
we have received from those new members in first year dues and contributions. (Common 
Cause 1983, p. B5) 
Given the expense of advertising through the mail, it is imperative that the organization 
recruit members in a cost-effective manner. Common Cause will consequently contact only those 
citizens whom they believe are most likely to join, to stay, and to contribute more than the minimum 
dues. The probability of being solicited is consequently a function of an estimated earnings stream. 
What citizen attributes, then, structure the probability of joining and contributing, and 
presumably the likelihood of being contacted, for symbolic groups such as Common Cause? The 
two characteristics that stand out are the ability to purchase membership and having the taste for it. 
A maintained hypothesis is that belonging to Common Cause is a nonnal good. The ability 
to purchase membership should reduce the relative costs of being a Common Cause contributor. 
However, a caveat should be added: Given the problems of collective action that organizational 
leaders of symbolic groups face, they are likely to try to keep the costs of joining low. If members 
are either willing to pay more initially to join or subsequently discover that they are so satisfied with 
their purchase that they are willing to contribute more, they will undoubtedly be asked for additional 
contributions. Indeed, 62.6 percent of respondents in the CC survey reported contributing more than 
their dues at some point 9 
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Demand should also differ across types of individuals because of variations in tastes. These, 
in turn, should be a function of two factors: policy preferences and political interest. 
Common Cause will be more attractive to those individuals with a positive view of what the 
organization represents. As a nonpartisan, liberal group, it should be more alluring to independents 
and Democrats than to Republicans. Independents should find the organization desirable because it 
has frequently campaigned against political parties. Democrats should view it favorably because its 
political activities have led to the forging of alliances with Democrats far more frequently than with 
Republicans and have been far more in tune with Democratic policy positions. 
Those who are politically interested will be more likely to receive benefits from 
contributing, ceteris paribus. It is not only whether an organization's position corresponds to a 
citizen's personal preferences that is important, but also how much weight the individual places on 
political issues. 
Thus, high levels of political interest and policy preferences that are roughly consistent with 
what Common Cause stands for will drive up the probability of agreeing to be an association 
member. The expected benefits of joining are based not only on very rough estimates about the 
returns from the collective goods the organization allegedly furnishes but also about the interactions 
and the selective benefits-notably a magazine but also political information and potential contacts 
for self-promotion-that the group might provide. The organization will seek out individudals with 
a high probability of joining, which will in turn lower their costs and make them more aware of the 
benefits of giving. 10
To summarize: Organizational recruitment is a two-stage process (Figure 1). This system 
can be expressed as follows: 
Pc = /(INT,PREF,PAY,u1)
Pj = g(CON,INT,PREF,PAY,u2)
(1) 
(2) 
where pc represents the probability of being contacted; pi, the probability of joining; INT, the level 
of political interest; PREF, the relevant political preferences; PAY, the ability to purchase 
membership; CON, whether the citizen has been contacted; and u 1 and u 2 are the corresponding
error terms. In reduced form, this translates into estimating 
Pi = h(INT,PREF,PAY,u3)
where u 3 represents the error term for forces outside the model. The estimated coefficients from 
equation (3) will be linear combinations of (1) and (2); however, the available data make it 
impossible to determine the relative contributions of the two sets of coefficients. 11
(Figure 1 about here) 
(3) 
FIGURE 1: A MODEL OF CONTRIBUTION BEHAVIOR 
Level of 
Political 
Interest 
Policy 
Preferences 
Organizational 
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Contribution 
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Membership 
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Why Do People Join Common Cause? 
Having laid out the infonnational assumptions, the benefits and costs of joining Common 
Cause, and the model to be estimated, it is now possible to turn to the heart of this analysis. Why do 
people join Common Cause? 
Measurement 
The previous discussion makes it clear that it is necessary to measure four underlying 
concepts: membership, the ability to purchase it, political interest, and policy preferences. 
Membership, the dependent variable, can be measured without difficulty. The 57 percent of 
respondents who were interviewed as part of the NES sample are scored a zero, and the remaining 43 
percent who were part of the CC sample are scored a one. 
The three factors specified to predict membership are measured as follows: 
(1) The ability to pay for membership is measured using 1980 family income.12 
(2) Political interest cannot be directly measured in the CC/NES sample, but its 
sociodemographic detenninants (Bennett 1986) can be employed as surrogates. By far the 
most important of these components is education; age and gender, however, both matter as 
well. Interest is therefore tapped by a series of dummy variables: one measuring 
educational achievement, in which those who have not been to college are scored as a zero; 13
a group that categorizes respondents according to their age, in which those who are less than 
25 years old are not included; and another in which those who are male are scored one. 
(3) Policy preferences are gauged with a series of dummy variables measuring party 
identification, where strong Republicans are the group omitted. Additionally, a dummy 
variable in which whites are scored one is incorporated based on the assumption that 
Common Cause has been active on procedural issues and not on the economic and social 
issues that should especially concern nonwhites.14 
Expectations for the impact of each influence are straightforward. A greater ability to pay 
will encourage membership, i.e., wealthier individuals should be more willing to purchase 
membership. A higher level of political interest will also be a positive detenninant of contributory 
behavior. Specifically, male, educated, and older respondents will all be more prone to join: It is 
possible, however, that extremely aged respondents may be somewhat less likely to sign up than 
those slightly younger, although the effect of age relative to the very young should still be positive. 
It is also posited that Democrats and independents will be more likely to join than strong 
Republicans, although the effect of party identification may not increase monotonically.15
Estimation: Dealing with Endogenous Sampling Designs 
This model cannot be estimated with standard pro bit or lo git techniques because of the 
problem of sampling endogeneity. As mentioned, the NES sample would contain, on average, two 
Common Cause members; the magnitude in the combined data set exceeds 40 percent, i.e., this is a 
sample that is stratified on the choice that is trying to be explained. Any model that is estimated 
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without adjusting for this fact will produce inconsistent estimates. 
The solution to this problem lies in the use of choice-based probability models (for surveys, 
see Maddala 1983, Amemiya 1985 , Ben-Akiva & Lerman 1985). The weighted exogenous sample 
maximum likelihood function (WESML) proposed by Manski and Lerman (1977) in particular is 
appropriate because the actual probability that an individual belongs to Common Cause is known.16
The intuition behind the Manski/Lennan solution is straightforward. If both the real world 
proportions of the groups in the sample (Qi)-about 1 out of every 800 individuals in the voting-age 
population belong to Common Cause-and the sample proportions ( Hi) are known, the sample can 
be treated as if it were exogenously selected, except that each observation is weighted by Qi/Hi. 
Except for this weighting, the maximization of the WESML function is identical to that of an 
exogenously chosen sample. In a random sample Qi/Hi is one; in others, underrepresented choices 
are more heavily weighted. Derived coefficients are not generally asymptotically efficient, but they 
are consistent; this makes WESML a quite satisfactory solution in reasonably large samples. 
More formally, for each i e C , where C is the choice set, it is possible to define the 
function w (i) by w (i) = Q(i) I H(i ). Assuming Q(i) is known and H(i) can be calculated directly 
from the data, w (i) is known. Consider then the weighted exogenous sampling likelihood function 
N N 
WN(y,0)= L, w(in)logP(in,Zn,0)+ L, w(in)logg(zn).n� n� 
where Zn is a vector of attributes, 0 is a parameter vector, and y = Cin, Zn). It is possible (although 
complicated) to show that (4) yields coefficients that are strongly consistent and asymptotically 
normal. The resulting covariance matrix is 
v = n-18n-1 where 
Q= [-E[ a
2w(i)logP(i,z,0)] l
a0a0' 9• • 
8= [ E[ aw(i)logP(i,z,0)] [ ()w(i)log�(i,z,0)] ] . 
a0 0• a0 0• 
and the expectations E operate over i and z with respect to the distribution given by 'Ac (z Ii )H(i ), 
where 'Ac (z Ii) is the likelihood of drawing z conditioned on drawing a decision maker who has 
selected i. 
Results 
The WESML estimates for the total sample demonstrate that contributory behavior is 
explicable through the application of choice-based techniques (Table 2). Given the overwhelming 
probability that a citizen in the voting age population will not join Common Cause, any properly 
(4) 
(5) 
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estimated model will still predict that everyone will be nonmembers; nevertheless, the structural 
model specified in this analysis permits the categorization of respondents by their likelihood of 
joining.17
This can be illustrated by examining two extreme cases. The results show that the 
probability that a black woman under 25 years of age, without any college education, who earns less 
than $10,000 per year, and is a strong Republican will join as an astronomical 1 in 20,000 ,000. 
Contrast this with the one in nine likelihood-90 times greater than for the average citizen-that a 
white male who has been to college, earns over $50,000 yearly, is over 70, and is an independent 
Democrat will sign up for Common Cause. 
(Table 2 about here) 
Both political interest and policy preferences influence the contribution decision in a highly 
predictable manner. However, the ability to purchase membership is apparently irrelevant. Clearly, 
drawing inferences only from the descriptive data is a dangerous exercise. 
High levels of political interest precipitate contributory behavior. Although females are as 
prone to sign up as males, older citizens are more likely to join than their younger counterparts. Nor 
is there an obvious diminution of participation even among the oldest group-perhaps reflecting the 
fact that it requires little effort to write a check once a year to maintain membership status. 
Similar to studies of voting participation (Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980), education has an 
extremely strong impact on decision-making. More educated citizens have a greater interest in 
politics; this increases considerably their propensity to sign up for a symbolic organization. 
Having the "correct" policy preferences also raises the probability of being a member. 
Democrats and independents are both more likely to join Common Cause: Those identifying with 
the Republican party are indistinguishable whether they claim that they are weak or strong partisans. 
The effect of party identification is not monotonic: The quintessential associational contributor is a 
Democratically leaning independent. 
Whites also find Common Cause more attractive than nonwhites. The allure of structure and 
process issues is apparently less for nonwhites who have other social and economic concerns that are 
important to them. 
Ability to pay, however, is irrelevant for joining. Assuming that family income accurately 
measures the relative membership costs-and despite dramatic differences in the income levels of 
members and nonmembers-this result implies that the price of belonging is unimportant for 
symbolic group membership. There is no support for the hypothesis that membership is a normal 
good. What explains this intuitively curious finding? 
The answer has already been foreshadowed: Organizational leaders recognize the problems 
of collective action and keep the monetary cost of membership so low that the ability to pay is 
irrelevant. If contributors are willing to spend more on membership, they can be assured that they 
will get requests for additional contributions. Organizational leaders at Common Cause seemed to 
have learned over the years that it pays to keep dues low: They have consciously allowed the real 
cost of joining the association to decline by more than two-thirds (the original $15 membership rate 
was increased to $20 in 1980 and has remained stable ever since). They have simultaneously tried to 
TABLE 2. DETERMINANTS OF GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
(WESML ESTIMATES) 
Variable 
Constant 
Ability to Purchase Membership 
Family Income 
Political Interest 
Gender 
Age 
28-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
61-65 
66-70 
70+ 
Education 
Policy Preferences 
Party Identificationb
Strong Democrat 
Weak Democrat 
Leaning Democrat 
Pure Independent 
Leaning Republican 
Weak Republican 
Race 
Number of Cases 
-2.x log likelihood function
***p :::; .10 **p :::; .05 *p :::; .01
0 Weights for the WES ML estimator are [ :;:!� ] 
respectively. 
WESML Coefficient<' 
(Standard Error) 
-15.919* 
(2.420) 
0.221 
(0.324) 
0.226 
(0.944) 
0.573*** 
(0.435) 
1.485* 
(0.480) 
2.160* 
(0.834) 
2.624* 
(0.829) 
3.384** 
(1.657) 
3.059* 
(1.095) 
3.914** 
(1.814) 
3.273* 
(0.635) 
2.337* 
(1.005) 
1.516** 
(0.686) 
3.268** 
(1.716) 
2.455* 
(0.858) 
1.724*** 
(1.089) 
0.475 
(0.654) 
1.786* 
(0.750) 
2545 
39 
[
.0013 l d' and 
.4538 
for nonmembers an members, 
b Independents are divided into Leaning Democrat, Pure Independent, and Leaning Republican.
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make up for this revenue erosion by "a steady intensification of fund raising to supplement dues" 
(Common Cause 1984, p. 7) and by improvements in production processes to lower Common 
Cause's costs.18 Put another way, by keeping member costs low, leaders can winnow down their
original undifferentiated mailing list to include only those with a fairly high probability of 
contributing additional sums and remaining in the association for a long time. 
Conclusions 
To the extent that scholars have empirically studied the joining decision, they have tended to 
employ descriptive data about associational contributors and draw implicit or explicit inferences. 
This is an unwarranted and misleading means of conducting research. When the membership choice 
is systematically examined, it becomes clear that there is no theoretical reason why a plethora of 
factors that distinguish members from citizens should be relevant for the joining decision; and the 
empirical evidence disconfirms the hypothesis that certain of these characteristics are germane. 
Political interest and a similar general policy orientation are both important elements of the 
contribution choice. Better educated and older citizens are far more interested in politics and willing 
to take a chance on an organization like Common Cause. So are Democrats, independents, and 
whites. 
In all likelihood, the factors precipitating membership funnel into the participation calculus 
in a number of ways that cannot be disentangled with a reduced-form estimation. Probably two 
underlying processes are key: (1) high levels of interest and policy preferences that match an 
organization's reputation raise the probability of being contacted and consequently reduce the cost of 
membership; and (2) interest and policy orientations increase the value of the benefits the 
organization offers. To reiterate, these benefits may derive not only from the association's stated 
goals but may also emanate from rough estimates concerning the value of whatever private 
inducements or opportunities for interaction are furnished. It is also possible that interested citizens 
are more likely to know others in the association and that they are more prone to be among the few 
who seek out membership opportunities. 
By contrast, the monetary cost of joining is not germane. Common Cause membership is a 
very unusual type of good. Organizational leaders keep the price so low that income does not 
represent a barrier to joining. This allows imperfectly informed citizes to join and sample the 
organization and learn whether what it offers is consistent with their preferences and worth 
continued contributions. 
To summarize: Politically interested individuals whose broad policy preferences are most 
likely to be a good match for Common Cause will join in greater proportion because their estimated 
costs are lower and their expected benefits are higher. This attraction can reflect not only their own 
behavior but the actions of organizational leaders. Over time, those who join will become more 
knowledgeable about the real costs and benefits of membership and make better informed decisions 
about whether to stay in the group and what level of monetary and nonmonetary contributions is 
appropriate for them. 
Finally, this analysis demonstrates the broader utility of choice-based models to answer 
questions that have been beyond the realm of more conventional research designs.19 Although the 
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model specified in the present analysis is admittedly a bit crude, the results have shed light on a 
important problem that researchers have been unable to examine in depth on the individual level. 
There are undoubtedly other research questions for which choice-based techniques can be profitably 
applied. 
* 
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Notes 
I would like to thank Jeffrey Dubin for going beyond the realm of collegial obligation in 
providing programming and econometric assistance; Jeffrey Flint, for research assistance; and 
Bruce Cain and Kevin Grier, for wise advice. It should be emphasized, however, that all errors 
are exclusively the author 's responsibility.
1. Hansen (1985) has also used aggregate-level data to estimate a context-dependent model based 
on prospect theory. Incorporating his insights on the individual level would require panel data. 
2. The Common Cause survey was conducted in the fall of 1981 by the political science
department of Stanford University. It was funded by grant SES-8105708 from the National
Science Foundation to Professor Heinz Eulau in support of research by Jonathan Siegel. Many
thanks to Mr. Siegel for generously furnishing these data to the author.
The National Election Study data were made available by the Inter-University Consortium 
for Political and Social Research. The 1980 NBS data were originally collected by the Center 
for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. Neither the 
original collectors of the data nor the consortium bears any responsibility for the analyses or 
interpretations presented here. 
Four potential complications in combining the NBS and the CC data deserve mention: (1) 
the possibility that the NBS respondents are members of Common Cause; (2) the roughly 12-
month time difference between the NBS and CC surveys; and (3) the differences in question 
wording (the CC survey, being a mail questionnaire, tended to have more tersely worded 
questions than the verbally administered NBS instrument); and (4) the possibility of 
econometric complications because the CC survey oversampled organization-designated 
activists. However, on average only two NBS respondents should be Common Cause 
members--since the association had roughly 200,000 members and the American electorate 
had a voting age population of roughly 165,000,000 circa 1980--so it can be assumed with 
impunity that no NBS respondents are group members. The effects of the temporal gap
between surveys should be minimal for almost all of the information employed in this research 
because these factors should change only slowly over time. Additionally, only those questions 
with identical or nearly identical wording were employed (see Appendix 1); the resulting data 
should be reasonably immune to these slight variations. Finally, the fact that activists were 
oversampled so that they made up 23 percent of the sample is unimportant: As long as the 
sample is stratified on exogenous characteristics,  it has no impact on the quality of the statistical 
analysis. 
3. In the years after the data utilized in this analysis were collected, Common Cause increasingly
incorporated other nonprocedural issues as part of its agenda, notably nuclear defense issues
such as the MX missile.
4. The NBS measured education in years; these data were put into the categories employed in the
CC study. The NBS also offered a far more varied list for respondents whose family income
was less than $50,000. CC members chose among the categories found in Table l ,  except that
more information was gathered on those earning in excess of $50,000. Since the NBS and CC
collected data on family income in 1979 and 1980, respectively, at a time of high inflation, the
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NES respondents claiming they earned from $9,000-$9,999, $17,000-$19,999, $23,000-
$24,999, and $30,000-34,999 were categorized in the $10,000-$20,000 , $20,000-$25 ,000, 
$25,000-$35,000 , and $35,000-$50,000 ranges, respectively. Of those who are nonwhites, 274 
are blacks and another 28 belong to other groups. Age was measured continuously in the NES 
study and collapsed into the categories incorporated in the CC instrument. The measure used 
for urbanism is the percentage urban in the congressional district as reported in the 
Congressional District Data Book; the occupations variable was derived by placing CC 
respondents into the categories used in the NES study. 
5.  These perfoimance evaluations may be endogenous t o  membership itself. Additionally, 
members were asked to evaluate the presidency; Common Cause members were far more 
negative. However, not only is it likely that these comments reflect an evaluation of an 
incumbent rather than an institution, but the time gap between the two surveys spanned the 
Carter to Reagan transition. The resulting data are completely unreliable. 
6. Even more than perfoimance evaluations, these behaviors must be seen as endogenous to group 
membership since the great majority of contributors surveyed had joined before the 1980 
election. Only to the extent that these electoral behaviors reflect a general predisposition to 
participate can these measures be viewed as both relevant for the group membership decision 
and exogenous to it 
NES respondents were also asked whether they had checked off donations on their income 
tax in those states where it was applicable. If those answering affiimatively are included, then 
11.9 percent of the national electorate contributed money in 1980. 
7. In short, the issue of whether the "p" teim is relevant (Mueller 1979) will not be considered in
this analysis; however, it is assumed that members of public interest groups are principally
concerned with benefits in teims of consumption. It is hard to believe that symbolic group
members really believe that they have an impact-especially since better educated individuals
are much more prone to join.
Both the CC and NES studies did include a question on political efficacy and attitudes 
toward political parties. However, not only are the responses likely to be endogenous to 
membership, but this question would provide an inaccurate measure of personal efficacy given 
Common Cause's hostility toward political parties. 
8. This is reflected in the fact that an analysis of four recent weeks worth of membership data 
reveals that 95 percent of the organizations' new members came from direct mail solicitation. 
The author would like to thank Mr. Jay Hedlund and Mr. Fred Wertheimer for supplying these 
data. 
9. This figure is somewhat exaggerated since, as mentioned, the CC sample overrepresents 
association designated activists. The percentage contributing additional money is 55.7 percent
and 77.0 percent for rank-and-file members and activists, respectively.
10. Common Cause uses its own set of surrogate measures in deciding whom to contact. It
principally sends solicitations to people on lists obtained from other organizations, direct-mail 
specialists, or upscale magazines (McFarland 1984).
14 
11. The absence of excluded exogenous variables makes the joining equation unidentifiable (for a
discussion of identification, see Maddala 1977). It is impossible to employ instrumental
variables and recovering structural parameters from the reduced from is precluded.
12. Family income is a six-fold measure using the categories found in Table 1.
13. The dichotomous measure of education results in a better fitting model than employing a series
of dummy variables and also avoids problems of multicollinearity.
14. Due to problems of multicollinearity and a severe loss of cases, liberalism-conservatism is not
incorporated into the analysis.
15. Given these strong expectations, one-tailed significance tests are employed.
16. If the real world probabilities are unknown, then-theoretically at least-there is a solution
developed by Manski and McFadden (1981).
17. Consequently, the percentage correctly predicted is a meaningless statistic for goodness of fit. 
18 . There is little evidence generally that income has a positive impact on Common Cause 
contributions. Previous analyses of the decision to stay in the group (Rothenberg 1987a) and to 
be an activist (Rothenberg 1987b) show that income is unimportant in the first instance and a 
deterrent in the second; when the retention model is rerun with a dichotomous dependent 
variable scored zero for those who did not report having at some time given extra money and a 
one for those who did, income is again discovered to be unimportant. This latter finding should 
be tempered by the acknowledgment that the amount of money individuals donate would 
ideally be the dependent variable: Income may determine whether members give $10 or 
$1,000. 
19. For example, Barke and Riker (1982) profitably use choice-based methods to explain ICC
railroad abandonments. However, this is the only application of these techniques by political
scientists that is known to this author.
15 
References 
Amemiya, Takeshi. 1985. Advanced Econometrics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Barke, Richard P., and William H. Riker. 1982. "A Political Theory of Regulation: Political 
Economy at the Interstate Commerce Commission." Public Choice 39:73-106. 
Ben-Akiva, Moshe, and Steven R. Lerman. 1985. Discrete Choice Analysis: Theory and 
Application to Travel Demand. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Bennett, Stephen Earl, and Linda L. M. Bennett. "Political Participation." In Annual Review of 
Political Science. Ed. Samuel Long. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishers. 
Bennett, Stephen Earl. 1986. Apathy in America, 1960-1984: Causes and Consequences of Citizen
Political Indifference. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers. 
Berry, Jeffrey M. 1977. Lobbying for the People: The Political Behavior of Public Interest Groups. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Brody, Richard A. 1978. "Political Participation." In The New American Political System. Ed. 
Anthony King. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. 
Common Cause 1984 Budget. 1983. Washington, DC: Common Cause. 
Common Cause Expenditure Review. 1984. Washington, DC: Common Cause. 
Cook, Constance E. 1984. "Participation in Public Interest Groups: Membership Motivations." 
American Political Quarterly 12:4()<)-430. 
Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Hansen, John Mark. 1985. "The Political Economy of Group Membership." American Political 
Science Review 79:79-96. 
Kau, James B., and Paul H. Rubin. 1982. Congressmen, Constituents and Contributions. Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff. 
Lunch, William M. 1987. The Nationalization of American Politics. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Maddala, G. S. 1983. Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Maddala, G. S. 1977. Econometrics. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Manski, Charles F., and Steven R. Lerman. 1977. "The Estimation of Choice Probabilities from 
Choice Based Samples." Econometrica 45:1977-1988. 
Manski, Charles F., and Daniel McFadden. 1981. "Alternative Estimates and Sample Designs for 
Discrete Choice Analysis." In Structural Analysts of Discrete Data with Econometric 
Applications. Ed. Charles F. Manski and Daniel McFadden. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
McFarland, Andrew S. 1976. Public Interest Lobbies. Washington, DC: American Enterprise 
Institute. 
McFarland, Andrew S. 1984. Common Cause: Lobbying in the Public Interest. Chatham, NJ: 
Chatham House. 
Milbrath, Lester W., and M. L. Goel. 1977. Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get 
Involved in Politics? Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Moe, Terry M. 1980. The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of 
16 
I merest Groups. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Mueller, Dennis C. 1979. Public Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Neuman, W. Russell. 1986. The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the 
American Electorate. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Polsby, Nelson W. 1981-1982. "Contemporary Transformations of American Politics: Thoughts on 
the Research Agenda of Political Scientists." Political Science Quarterly 96:551-570. 
Rothenberg, Lawrence S. 1987a. "Organizational Maintenance and the Retention Decision: A 
Theory of Experiential Search." Social Science Working Paper No. 651. Pasadena: California
Institute of Technology. 
Rothenberg, Lawrence S. 1987b. "The Route to Activism is through Experience: Contributor 
Mobilization in Interest Groups." Social Science Working Paper No. 662. Pasadena:
California Institute of Technology. 
Truman, David B. 1951. The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion. New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Verba, Sidney, and Norman H. Nie. 1972. Participation in America: Political Democracy and 
Social Equality. New York: Harper & Row.
Wolfinger, Raymond E., and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. Who Votes? New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
17 
Appendix 1 :  Question Wording of Common Cause and National Election Study Questions
For many of the sociodemographic questions-on age, sex, income, race, etc.--question 
wording is not problematic. The possibility that wording nuances will make a difference is more 
germane for behavioral and especially attitudinal questions; only measures with extremely similar 
wording were employed. As mentioned, the questions in the NBS instrument were somewhat longer, 
reflecting the fact that it was used in a face-to-face interview rather than as a mail questionnaire. 
Party Identification 
(CC) "We hear a lot of talk about liberals and conservatives. Below is a scale on which the political 
views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where 
would y ou place yourself on this scale?" 
(NBS) "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or what?" 
[Those identifying a partisan preference] "Would you call yourself a strong Republican 
(Democrat) or a not very strong Republican (Democrat)?" 
[Those calling themselves Independents] "Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican
or to the Democratic party?" 
Liberalism-Conservatism 
(CC) "We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale 
on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely
conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale?" 
(NBS) Same wording, except the phrase "or haven't you thought much about this" is appended to 
the question. 
Performance Rating Questions 
In both surveys, performance ratings were requested for the federal government in Washington, 
the presidency, Congress-specifically defined as the U.S. Senate and the House of 
Representatives-the Supreme Court, and the political parties. For the NBS, respondents are coded
on a nine-point scale with points labeled very poor job (0), poor job (2), fair job ( 4), good job (6), 
and very good job (8); the Common Cause respondents had these five options without intermediate 
options. The introductory statements were slightly different: 
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(CC) "Now we 'd like to know how good a job you feel some of the parts of our government are 
doing for the country as a whole. Do you feel that each of the following of government is doing a 
very poor job, a poor job, a fair job, a good job, or a very good job?" 
(NES) "Now we 'd like to ask you how good a job you feel some of the parts of our government are 
doing. As I read, please give me the number that describes how good a job you feel that part of 
government is doing for the country as a whole." 
Political Efficacy and Attitudes toward Parties 
The NES and CC studies ask one nearly identical question designed to tap political efficacy and 
attitudes toward parties: The NES version states that "Parties are only interested in people's votes 
but not in their opinions." The CC question drops the term only. In the NES, respondents are asked
whether they agree or disagree; in the CC study, respondents may check strongly agree, agree 
somewhat, not sure, disagree somewhat, or strongly disagree. 
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Participation Activity 
Two questions tapped the same political activities in the 1980 election. 
(CC) "Did you do any of these activities on behalf of a candidate in the 1980 election?" 
"Contributed money to a political campaign?" 
"Did political work in a campaign organization?" 
(NES) "What about other contributions? Did you give any money this year to a candidate running 
for public office?" 
"Did you do any work for one of the parties of candidates (during the campaign)?" 
